The Worst Inflation in 26 Years
Gold Surges Toward $1000, Silver at 27 Year High
Greenspan Urges Gulf States to Drop Dollar
Business Investment Weakens in January
"I believe the country faces a critical crossroad and that the decisions that are made or not made within the next 10 years or so will have a profound effect on the future of our country, our children and our grandchildren. The problem gets bigger every day, and the tidal wave gets closer every day." - David Walker, comptroller general Aug. 2005
A confidential proposal that Bank of America circulated to members of Congress this month provides a stunning glimpse of how quickly the industry has reversed its laissez-faire disdain for second-guessing by the government — now that it is in trouble.
The proposal warns that up to $739 billion in mortgages are at “moderate to high risk” of defaulting over the next five years and that millions of families could lose their homes.
To prevent that, Bank of America suggested creating a Federal Homeowner Preservation Corporation that would buy up billions of dollars in troubled mortgages at a deep discount, forgive debt above the current market value of the homes and use federal loan guarantees to refinance the borrowers at lower rates.
“We believe that any intervention by the federal government will be acceptable only if it is not perceived as a bailout of the bond market,” the financial institution noted.
In practice, taxpayers would almost certainly view such a move as a bailout. If lawmakers and the Bush administration agreed to this step, it could be on a scale similar to the government’s $200 billion bailout of the savings and loan industry in the 1990s. The arguments against a bailout are powerful. It would mostly benefit banks and Wall Street firms that earned huge fees by packaging trillions of dollars in risky mortgages, often without documenting the incomes of borrowers and often turning a blind eye to clear fraud by borrowers or mortgage brokers.
A rescue would also create a “moral hazard,” many experts contend, by encouraging banks and home buyers to take outsize risks in the future, in the expectation of another government bailout if things go wrong again.
If the government pays too much for the mortgages or the market declines even more than it has already, Washington — read, taxpayers — could be stuck with hundreds of billions of dollars in defaulted loans.
But a growing number of policy makers and community advocacy activists argue that a government rescue may nonetheless be the most sensible way to avoid a broader disruption of the entire economy.
The House Financial Services Committee is working on various options, including a government buyout. The Bush administration may be softening its hostility to a rescue as well. Top officials at the Treasury Department are hoping to meet with industry executives next week to discuss options, according to two executives.
Step 1 is the worst housing recession in US history. House prices will, he says, fall by 20 to 30 per cent from their peak, which would wipe out between $4,000 billion and $6,000 billion in household wealth. Ten million households will end up with negative equity and so with a huge incentive to put the house keys in the post and depart for greener fields. Many more home-builders will be bankrupted.
Step 2 would be further losses, beyond the $250 billion-$300 billion now estimated, for sub-prime mortgages. About 60 per cent of all mortgage origination between 2005 and 2007 had “reckless or toxic features”, argues Roubini. Goldman Sachs estimates mortgage losses at $400 billion. But if home prices fell by more than 20 per cent, losses would be bigger. That would further impair the banks’ ability to offer credit.
Step 3 would be big losses on unsecured consumer debt: credit cards, auto loans, student loans and so forth. The “credit crunch” would then spread from mortgages to a wide range of consumer credit.
Step 4 would be the downgrading of the monoline insurers, which do not deserve the AAA rating on which their business depends. A further $150 billion writedown of asset-backed securities would then ensue.
Step 5 would be the meltdown of the commercial property market, while Step 6 would be bankruptcy of a large regional or national bank.
Step 7 would be big losses on reckless leveraged buy-outs. Hundreds of billions of dollars of such loans are now stuck on the balance sheets of financial institutions.
Step 8 would be a wave of corporate defaults. On average, US companies are in decent shape, but a “fat tail” of companies has low profitability and heavy debt. Such defaults would spread losses in “credit default swaps”, which insure such debt. The losses could be $250 billion. Some insurers might go bankrupt.
Step 9 would be a meltdown in the “shadow financial system”. Dealing with the distress of hedge funds, special investment vehicles and so forth will be made more difficult by the fact that they have no direct access to lending from central banks.
Step 10 would be a further collapse in stock prices. Failures of hedge funds, margin calls and shorting could lead to cascading falls in prices.
Step 11 would be a drying-up of liquidity in a range of financial markets, including interbank and money markets. Behind this would be a jump in concerns about solvency.
Step 12 would be “a vicious circle of losses, capital reduction, credit contraction, forced liquidation and fire sales of assets at below fundamental prices”.These, then, are 12 steps to meltdown. In all, argues Roubini: “Total losses in the financial system will add up to more than $1,000 billion and the economic recession will become deeper more protracted and severe.” This, he suggests, is the “nightmare scenario” keeping Ben Bernanke and colleagues at the US Federal Reserve awake. It explains why, having failed to appreciate the dangers for so long, the Fed has lowered rates by 200 basis points this year. This is insurance against a financial meltdown.
Canada Economy Reels as U.S. Slowdown Cuts Factory Orders, Jobs
The impact of the U.S. housing slump is spreading in western Quebec's sparsely populated Antoine-Labelle county, where 17 plants have closed since residential construction began to plummet two years ago. The region has lost more than 10 percent of its 18,000 jobs, prompting Kanenda's former workers to buy the bankrupt facility and try to reopen it.
"We're now at a really critical juncture." said Yvon Cormier, head of a development agency for the region. "When something goes wrong with the U.S. market, we feel it immediately."
Only three months ago, the Bank of Canada's Senior Deputy Governor Paul Jenkins told a New York audience that growing demand from China and India for commodities meant the U.S. and Canadian economies "respond in different ways to certain shocks." Canada was benefiting from rising prices for its oil, metals, fertilizer and nickel. Some factories were coping with a weakening U.S. dollar by buying new equipment and cutting costs.
In December, Canada lost 33,200 factory jobs, and there's no evidence the losses have stopped. Canfor Corp., the largest producer of Canadian softwood lumber, said Jan. 18 it would shut two more mills, the latest in a series of closures that has erased almost 6,000 industry jobs since October.
Montreal-based AbitibiBowater Inc., North America's largest newsprint producer, on Jan. 31 announced an eight-week layoff of 115 mill workers in western Quebec and 325 elsewhere.
Exports of lumber and sawmill products fell 21 percent in the first 11 months of 2007, dragged down by the U.S. housing slump. In December, U.S. house prices marked the first annual decline since the Great Depression.
Babcock & Wilcox Canada, an Ontario maker of power- generation equipment and subsidiary of Houston, Texas,-based McDermott International Inc., is cutting about 75 workers as orders from its parent slow.
"On average, the survey's 52 respondents put the odds of a recession at 49%, up from 40% in the January survey and 23% in June. Moreover, if a recession does materialize, they gave 39% odds that it will be worse than the past two recessions . . .
On average, the economists, who were surveyed between Jan. 31 and Feb. 4, predicted the nation's gross domestic product -- or total output of goods and services -- will expand at a 0.6% annual rate in the first three months of this year; that is down from the 1.2% pace predicted in the previous survey. In fact, they lowered their growth estimates for every quarter of 2008. The economy grew a slim 0.6% in the fourth quarter of 2007, a sharp deceleration from the third quarter's 4.9%.
If there is a downturn, the economists said, there is a better than 1-in-3 chance it will be worse than the one in 2001 or the one that ended in early 1991."
Twenty-five years ago, when most economists were extolling the virtues of financial deregulation and innovation, a maverick named Hyman P. Minsky maintained a more negative view of Wall Street; in fact, he noted that bankers, traders, and other financiers periodically played the role of arsonists, setting the entire economy ablaze. Wall Street encouraged businesses and individuals to take on too much risk, he believed, generating ruinous boom-and-bust cycles. The only way to break this pattern was for the government to step in and regulate the moneymen.
Many of Minsky’s colleagues regarded his “financial-instability hypothesis,” which he first developed in the nineteen-sixties, as radical, if not crackpot. Today, with the subprime crisis seemingly on the verge of metamorphosing into a recession, references to it have become commonplace on financial Web sites and in the reports of Wall Street analysts.
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If anybody is at fault it is Greenspan, who kept interest rates too low for too long and ignored warnings, some from his own colleagues, about what was happening in the mortgage market. But he wasn’t the only one. Between 2003 and 2007, most Americans didn’t want to hear about the downside of funds that invest in mortgage-backed securities, or of mortgages that allow lenders to make monthly payments so low that their loan balances sometimes increase. They were busy wondering how much their neighbors had made selling their apartment, scouting real-estate Web sites and going to open houses, and calling up Washington Mutual or Countrywide to see if they could get another home-equity loan. That’s the nature of speculative manias: eventually, they draw in almost all of us.
Perma-Bulls always cling to the theory that someone or something will come to the rescue to save the economy and prevent a recession. Why shouldn't they feel this way? Easy Al Greenspan was always there to save the markets and inject the necessary liquidity to keep the markets going higher. Long Term Capital Management Bust...No Problem! Tech bubble burst...No Problem! September 11th...No Problem! Recession...No Problem! Now that Ben Bernanke has taken over, he seems to be "playing ball" with Wall Street but he is running out of ammunition with all the rate cuts that he's already used up.
Michael Shedlock wrote a great article today entitled Bulls Cling To Misguided Hopes which addresses all the dashed hopes and dreams of Bulls hoping to fend off the inevitable recession.
It is a MUST READ!
Highlights:
Containment Theory Escalation
-Problems are contained to subprime.
-Problems are contained to subprime and Alt-A.
-Problems are contained to residential housing.
-Problems spread to Canada, Norway, Europe, UK, Japan and anyplace else dumb enough to buy US asset backed commercial paper.
-Paulson creates Super SIV bailout proposal.
-Super SIV bailout proposal collapses.
-Containment spreads to corporate real estate.
-Realization containment theory failed.
The containment theory was followed by the "Fed Will Save The Day Theory". Let's take a glance at the progression of that theory.
Fed Will Save The Day Theory Escalation
-Fed does surprise discount rate cut.
-Fed cuts interest rates to 4.75 to 4.50 to 4.25
-Fed cuts interest rates in surprise move to 3.50
-Fed cuts interest rates again 8 days later to 3.0
-Fed will likely cut to 2.5% in March
The Decouple Theory
In conjunction with the Fed Theory we had the Decouple Theory. The idea behind the decouple theory is simple. It is a global extension to the "It's Well Contained Theory". The refinement hung on the misguided belief that problems will be contained to the United States. This theory was shattered in a Global Equity Selloff and a virtual lockup of bond markets in Europe and the UK.
The Sovereign Wealth Fund Theory
The other day in response to a reader query about sovereign wealth funds, I made this statement: "Those dollars will eventually come home to buy US assets. A piece of Pfizer, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Exxon Mobile. How exactly does that cause "inflation"? "
Walking Away
People are walking away from houses for two reasons
-Some because they can afford them but don't want them
-Others because they have to
Bernanke will not succeed at containing that sentiment change. The Fed can only exaggerate the current trend it cannot change the trend.
Points of Failure
-Banks are unable or unwilling to extend credit
-Consumers and businesses are unable or unwilling to borrow
We are seeing both sides of this equation now, unwillingness to lend and unwillingness to borrow.
Why are bond insurers so important? Because their failure would represent another lurch down in the credit crunch. The original business of the insurers, usually referred to as “monolines”, was to lend their names to bonds issued by municipal authorities (American state and local governments). The municipals were not strong enough by themselves to qualify for an AAA rating; the backing of the monolines reduced their borrowing costs. And since municipal bonds very rarely defaulted, everyone was happy.
Had they stuck to insuring municipals, there would be no problem. But a predictable and safe business always brings pressure to diversify, especially for quoted companies. The monolines moved into insuring collateralised-debt obligations (portfolios of bonds that are sliced and diced into tranches bearing different risk), and that got them caught in the subprime crisis.
Microsoft blew all of its cash on hand to pick up less than 18% of the search engine market. Microsoft and Yahoo combined only have a 31.5% share compared to Google's (GOOG) 56.3% share.
One of the reasons to own Microsoft was that someday it would do something intelligent with its huge cash hoard. So far it has attempted to prop up its share price with huge special dividends, and now it is willing to part with every penny on its balance sheet to buy Yahoo!
With this offer, Microsoft has somehow decided this is the bottom for tech. I disagree. Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that anyone else could possibly come up with $44 billion to buy Yahoo in this market climate. So what's the rush?
Heading into a consumer led recession was Yahoo!'s ad revenue going to significantly jump? No Chance! Even Google is struggling to grow.
Everyone, including Microsoft is underestimating how deep this recession is going to get and what that might do to earnings. Had Microsoft waited, it might have been able to get Yahoo! for 1/3 or even 1/4th the current offer.